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Chinese Foundations and the 
Challenge of ‘Going International’*
Lindan Tan1 and Huib Huyse2
Abstract China’s international cooperation strategies are 
gradually changing due to evolving views about the limits of its 
internationalisation approach, which has traditionally mainly 
focused on building governmental and business relationships. 
Intensified interactions with low-income countries in the context 
of the Belt and Road Initiative are perceived to benefit from an 
increased role for its domestic non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). This article explores China’s initial steps in enabling the 
domestic NGO landscape to internationalise by looking at this 
development from an organisational capacity perspective. By 
assessing five key organisational characteristics of 36 Chinese 
foundations engaging in international cooperation, we find 
that the average organisational capacity for international 
cooperation is still limited but shows gradual improvement. While 
they all comply with government regulations in governance 
and several foundations have large budgets and capacity 
for domestic operations, our findings suggest that only a few 
currently mobilise substantial human and financial resources for 
their international activities.
Keywords non-governmental organisations (NGOs), foundation, 
international cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative, China.
1 Introduction
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by Chinese President 
Xi Jinping in 2013 is by far the most prominent example of China’s 
growing international ambitions in the areas of trade, diplomacy, 
and international cooperation. Certain studies (e.g. Maliszewska 
and Mensbrugghe 2019) conclude that the outcomes would be 
largely beneficial; global income would increase by 0.7 per cent 
and the BRI areas are estimated to capture 82 per cent of the 
gain. Other studies (e.g. Deych 2019) are more critical and accuse 
China of ‘neo-colonialism’, claiming that China is guided only by 
its own interests, even violating human rights and disregarding 
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environmental regulations. The Chinese government feels 
misunderstood in what it perceives as misconceptions, although it 
acknowledges that these two areas might require more attention.
First, not all Chinese enterprises overseas attach sufficient 
importance to the fulfilment of social responsibility. This is 
reflected, for example, in the social responsibility development 
index of Chinese enterprises, which shows scores as low as 5.67 
on average (Zhong, Ye and Zhang 2017) for Chinese companies 
overseas, compared to 35.1 for enterprises working in China 
(Huang et al. 2017).
Second, there are signs that China realises that its own state-led 
development model cannot meet all the needs for effective 
engagement, and multilateral dialogue and cooperation with 
low-income countries.
Regarding both challenges, the Chinese government sees a 
potential role for Chinese non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), as stated in policy documents from 2015 onwards. NGOs 
can urge Chinese overseas enterprises to pay more attention to 
their environmental and social responsibilities on the one hand, 
while complementing China’s traditional unilateral diplomacy and 
showing a different side of China, on the other hand. In recent 
years, the Chinese government has developed a relatively active 
policy framework to facilitate the international collaboration of 
Chinese NGOs.
This article takes note of this development and asks the question 
as to what extent the Chinese NGO landscape is evolving in line 
with these policy intentions. More specifically, the article assesses 
the extent to which Chinese NGOs are prepared for a growing 
role in international cooperation. Estimates for the year 2014 show 
that only 529 out of a total of 606,048 NGOs were engaging in 
activities abroad (MCA 2015). While the absolute numbers remain 
low, even less is known about their capacity to engage at the 
international level.
In Section 2, we define the concept of NGOs in China and in 
Section 3, we frame the rise of Chinese NGOs with international 
activities within recent developments. This is followed by a short 
literature review of the organisational capacity assessment, and 
the designed assessment framework, in Section 4. Section 5 
assesses the readiness of Chinese foundations, a subgroup of 
NGOs, to enter the international arena, based on the screening 
of a random sample of 36 foundations across five dimensions: 
organisational internal governance capacity, organisational 
economic capacity, human resource capacity, organisational 
sustainability, and international cooperation experience. The 
organisational capacity assessment framework is constructed 
around 21 relevant indicators identified in the annual reports from 
these foundations. Section 6 concludes, giving tentative insights 
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into how China’s foundations are slowly turning their attention to 
low-income countries, although in a careful and modest way in 
terms of financial and human resources.
2 NGOs, social organisations, and foundations
China’s NGO landscape has evolved steadily over the last 
three decades (Figure 1), increasing from 4,446 NGOs in 1988 to 
866,335 in 2019. This associational growth has similarities with 
what has happened in other countries, although the comparison 
is complicated by the differences in how NGOs are defined. An 
in-depth comparison would go beyond the scope of this article. 
China’s policy framework distinguishes between three types of 
NGO: (1) social organisations; (2) people-run non-enterprise units; 
and (3) foundations.
In 2019, the biggest group (56 per cent) was that of people-run 
non-enterprise units, which are defined as institutions, societies, 
and other social forces established with non-state-owned assets 
by individual citizens for non-profit social services (SCIO 1998a). 
Social organisations are the second largest group of NGOs 
(43 per cent), and essentially cover non-profit organisations 
voluntarily created by Chinese citizens to achieve the collective 
desires of members, and conduct activities according to their 
charters (SCIO 1998b). The smallest group is that of foundations 
(7,585, or around 1 per cent), which are defined as non-profit legal 
entities that employ assets donated by actual persons, legal 
entities, or other organisations for the purpose of engaging in 
some public benefit enterprise (SCIO 2004).
Chinese foundations are the focus of our study. They have a 
long history of involvement in international cooperation and 
Source Authors’ own, based on data from MCA (2020).
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their role has been particularly emphasised since the BRI was 
launched. As early as 1951, the Chinese Red Cross Foundation 
(CRCF) was involved in international relief efforts in Korea. The 
China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation’s (CFPA) medical aid in 
Sudan since 2010 has been a typical example of a Chinese NGO 
going to Africa. Since 2014, the China Foundation for Peace and 
Development (CFPD) has been actively responding to the BRI 
by creating the Friends of the Silk Road brand and launching 
international cooperation activities in Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, 
and other countries, mainly in the form of education assistance. 
In 2017, CFPA was commissioned and funded by China’s Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) to carry out an international volunteer 
project, which marked the first time that NGOs were included in 
the framework of China’s foreign aid work.
Within NGOs’ annual reporting requirements, international 
activities are understood by the Chinese government as 
participating in international conferences, setting up offices 
overseas, participating in international organisations, providing 
assistance to international NGOs in China, and conducting 
international projects.
3 Chinese NGOs entering the world scene
In Western countries, the internationalisation of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) has come in several waves (Develtere, 
Huyse and Van Ongevalle 2021). Initial internationalisation 
efforts originated in the trade union movement and around 
humanitarian work (e.g. the International Red Cross). Subsequent 
waves originated during colonial times; the post-war period; at 
the end of the 1960s (the so-called third world movement); in the 
1980s and 1990s (new humanitarian NGOs); and post-2000 (social 
entrepreneurs and private initiatives). Over the last decades, a 
growing body of Chinese and international research has looked 
into the expansion of the Chinese NGO landscape, in education, 
environment, health, culture, disaster relief, and so forth (Wang 
2001; Tang and Zhan 2008; Xu, Zeng and Anderson 2005; Hsu and 
Jiang 2015; Kang 2017), also comparing this with trends in Western 
countries (Spires 2012; Hsu and Teets 2016).
Much less is known about the activities of Chinese NGOs 
abroad, with the exception of a limited number of studies. Some 
scholars have documented the work of Chinese NGOs in areas 
such as global governance (Buckley 2013), service delivery and 
technical support (Huang et al. 2014), advocacy (towards Chinese 
enterprises) (Deng and Wang 2015), and cultural exchanges 
(Hsu, Hildebrandt and Hasmath 2016). In addition, scholars 
have critically assessed the activities of Chinese NGOs in Africa, 
observing a general reluctance to engage deeply in international 
cooperation in the face of uncertainties in the Sino-African policy 
framework (Brenner 2012). Others have documented the limited 
impact of Chinese NGOs in countries such as Ethiopia and Malawi 
(Hsu et al. 2016).
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Moreover, the capacity and efficiency of Chinese NGOs 
to roll out activities in low-income countries is a largely 
under-researched topic. Huang et al. (2014) compared the 
internationalisation strategies of Chinese NGOs with those 
of foreign CSOs and Chinese enterprises. They found that 
Chinese NGOs had to operate within an inadequate policy 
framework, and lacked human resources and financial support, 
resulting in poor performance and impact. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP 2017) in China assessed the 
challenges faced by 18 Chinese foreign-related CSOs in their 
international cooperation activities, based on three factors: type 
of organisation, geographical distribution, and business area. 
This survey-based research concluded that Chinese CSOs were 
only in the nascent stage of ‘going out’, resulting in low scores 
for performance. Qiu and Liu (2019) conducted field surveys of 
Chinese foundations such as CFPA and CRCF and found a serious 
lack of technical support, legal guarantees, professional staff, and 
funds during their international projects.
There are indications that the policy context is gradually 
becoming more conducive for Chinese NGOs. The BRI is acting as 
a catalyst in encouraging a larger role for NGOs in international 
cooperation. At least five recent policies and communications 
facilitate a ‘going out’ strategy for Chinese NGOs step by step. 
First, a 2015 policy was issued in the context of the BRI which 
suggests increased exchanges and cooperation between 
NGOs of countries along the Belt and Road (NDRC, MFA and 
MOFCOM 2015). Second, in 2016, a policy was issued that NGOs 
should be guided to play a supporting role in foreign economic, 
cultural, scientific and technological, educational, sports, and 
environmental protection exchanges, as well as acting as a 
platform for civil society in foreign exchange (General Office of 
the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State 
Council 2016).
Third, in 2015, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee 
and the General Office of the State Council also encouraged 
NGOs to participate in international organisation projects and 
support foreign aid work in a more structured way (General Office 
of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the 
State Council 2015). Fourth, in 2016, MOFCOM stated that it would 
support NGOs through the South-South Cooperation Assistance 
Fund to implement assistance projects abroad (MOFCOM 2016).
Finally, since the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum 
(BRF) for International Cooperation was held in Beijing in May 
2017 (Xinhuanet 2017), Chinese President Xi Jinping has launched 
the idea of developing a network for cooperation among the 
NGOs in countries along the Belt and Road, as well as initiating 
new people-to-people exchange platforms in a variety of formal 
settings. Chinese scholars have used these political statements 
and policy changes to point at the ‘unprecedented opportunities’ 
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for Chinese NGOs to enter the world stage, especially 




Research on organisational capacity assessment (OCA) has 
evolved considerably over the last decades. Since the 1970s 
and 1980s, the focus has shifted from organisational capacity 
as human resources combined with a limited set of ‘hard 
capacities’ (e.g. accounting and infrastructure), to frameworks 
that also include a set of ‘soft capacities’ (e.g. leadership, 
learning, and self-renewal), further inspired by complexity 
thinking (Huyse et al. 2012). In their review of the literature on 
organisational capacity in the development sector, Holvoet and 
Leslie (2013) conclude that only two frameworks are supported by 
a wide body of evidence.
First, Kaplan (1999) identified both elements related to hard 
capacities, such as material and financial resources and 
skills, as well as elements related to soft capacities, including 
organisational attitude and the organisation’s understanding of 
the world. Second, Land et al. (2008) developed and tested a 
conceptual framework with five core organisational capabilities, 
which again combines both hard and soft capacities.
While the two frameworks stress the importance of both ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ elements when assessing organisational capacity, the 
absence of data may complicate the assessment of the latter 
(Holvoet and Leslie 2013). Considering that this research relies on 
secondary data available in the public domain, it faces similar 
constraints. As our index to assess the capacity for international 
cooperation (CIC) is mainly based on indicators that relate 
to hard capacities, our assessment is likely to act as a proxy 
for organisational stability, and to some extent organisational 
performance, rather than adaptability (ibid.). To assess the latter, 
one would need to assess soft capacities in addition to hard 
capacities.
More specifically, based on a review of annual working reports of 
Chinese foundations, 21 indicators in five sub-dimensions were 
identified to establish an index for the CIC (see Table 1). The 
sub-dimensions – internal governance capacity, human resource 
capacity, and organisational sustainability – provide indications 
of organisational stability. Organisational performance relates to 
organisational economic capacity and international cooperation 
experience. The resulting theoretical framework and the CIC index 
provide indications of the capacity for international cooperation, 
which need to be validated and further explored in future 
research efforts.
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4.2 Variable and assessment framework
Using yaahp v10.0 and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
proposed by Saaty (2008), a representative subjective weighting 
method was used to assign weights to the 21 indicators of the 
variable of CIC. The weighting is based on the subjective opinions 
of 12 Chinese experts who focus on NGO-related research on the 
relative importance of the indicators when compared two by two.
Table 1 Measurement indicators of the capacity for international cooperation (CIC)
Target level Criterion level Index level










A council is in place 0.05
A supervisory board is in place 0.05
An information disclosure system is in place 0.05
Administrative penalties have been imposed 0.05
C2: Human 
resource capacity
Number of full-time staff 0.067
Percentage of full-time staff with a bachelor’s 
degree or above
0.067




Length of organisational development history 0.067
Average staff salary 0.067






Donations from the international community 0.034
Number of international cooperation projects 0.05
Amount spent on international projects 0.05
Percentage of expenditure on international projects 0.044
A department responsible for international 






Eligible for tax exemption status 0.022
Donation income 0.05
Government subsidy income 0.025
Total income for the year 0.044
Total fixed assets 0.022
Net assets 0.036
Source Authors’ own.
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The ‘Min-Max standardisation’ was then used to perform the 
linear transformation of the original data, mapping the value 
between [0,1] to ensure the comparability of data. Subsequently, 
the following formula for calculating the weighted average of 
the CIC was constructed. We define that Qi falling within [0.8,1] 
indicates that the CIC is very high; within [0.6,0.8) indicates high; 
within [0.4,0.6) indicates medium; within [0.2,0.4) indicates low; and 
within [0,0.2) indicates very low.
Where, Qij is the CIC of foundation j in year i, k represents the 
constructed 21 indicators, Wij is the weight of each indicator, and 
Zij is the standardised value; Qi is the overall value of CIC in year i, 
h represents the sample size, and Iij is the weight of each sample. 
We used Stata15.0 for the analysis.
4.3 Research sample and data sources
We collected panel data from the 36 foundations, which were 
randomly selected. This corresponds with around one third of the 
total population of foundations (108) that claim to have some 
international involvement in their annual working reports during 
the period 2014–19. This subgroup of 108 foundations accounts 
for less than 1.5 per cent of all foundations (7,585). All data were 
sourced from annual working reports of foundations that are 
publicly available as required by Article 38 of the Regulations on 
Funds (SCIO 2004). We use the mean imputation method to deal 
with missing data.
5 Empirical analysis
Figure 2 visualises the main scores for the CIC, as well as the 
scores for the five sub-dimensions for the 36 foundations 
throughout 2014–19. Our index suggests that the foundations in 
our sample have increased their CIC from a score of 0.37 in 2014 
to 0.4297 in 2019 but still cannot truly meet China’s expectations 
of advocating NGOs to ‘go out’ in the context of the BRI.
5.1 Stability: strong self-governance, low legal risk but limited 
organisational sustainability and human resources
All the foundations in our sample comply with the governance 
regulations of the Chinese government, resulting in the maximum 
score for this dimension. This implies that all of them have a board 
of directors and a supervisory board. They also comply with the 
rules of Article 38 of the Regulations on Funds to disclose their 
finances and activities information for inspection and supervision 
by the public. In addition, none of them violated Chinese 
government regulations in the area of governance or have been 
subject to administrative penalties.
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The organisational sustainability dimension receives a low score in 
2014 (0.33), moving to medium in the period 2017–19. The indicators 
provide further clarifications. Many foundations offer low staff 
salaries, such as the Yu Panglin Charity Foundation (YPLCF) in 2016 
(¥13,650 (£1,533)), the COSCO Shipping Charity Foundation (CSCF) 
in 2014 (¥22,000 (£2,471)), and the China Birth Defect Intervention 
and Relief Foundation (CBDIRF) in 2014 (¥24,000 (£2,696)). In the 
competitive Chinese labour market, this might affect the ability 
to attract high-performing professionals. Some foundations are 
very old, such as the China Children and Teenagers’ Fund (CCTF) 
which was established 40 years ago. The second group of seven 
foundations is about 30 years old, others are much more recent. 
Only three foundations have five different sources of income, 
around one third have four sources, and half of the group has 
three sources of income.
The average human resource capacity of the 36 foundations 
was low (0.33) in 2014 and medium (0.35) by 2019. Firstly, with 
82 per cent of full-time staff in possession of a bachelor’s degree, 
the educational level of the foundation staff is relatively high. 
However, except for two foundations (CFPA and the China Youth 
Development Foundation (CYDF)), all of the other foundations 
had less than 100 full-time staff in 2018. One third of the 
foundations had less than ten full-time staff in 2014. A similar trend 
can be observed for the number of volunteers. Some foundations 
have large numbers, such as the Shenzhen One Foundation 
Charity Fund (SZOFCF) which had 153,172 volunteers in 2019, while 
the International Scientific Exchange Foundation of China (ISEFC), 
YPLCF, and the China Guang Hua Science and Technology 
Foundation (GHF) had none.
Figure 2 Time evolution of the capacity for international cooperation, 2014–19
Source Authors’ own.
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5.2 Organisational performance: weak international cooperation 
experience and economic capacity
Of the five dimensions, international cooperation experience 
has the lowest score: 0.08 in 2014 and 0.11 in 2019. It confirms 
that Chinese foundations tend to have minimal experience in 
international cooperation. In 2014, only 17 out of 35 foundations 
received international donations. In 2019, the number grew 
to 23, but the percentage is still very small and the average 
international donation is just ¥7.42m (£0.83m). Second, while 
few foundations might have participated in international 
conferences or assisted international NGOs in their activities 
in China, most have not had structural activities abroad, such 
as setting up offices overseas or establishing international 
departments. In 2019, three quarters of the foundations did 
not have any overseas office. Similarly, only a small minority 
have actually implemented international cooperation projects 
abroad. For most foundations, the average percentage of 
expenditure on international projects was just 17 per cent, 
showing that it is not at the core of their operations. The 
Chinese Language and Culture Education Foundation of 
China (CLEF) is a notable exception, with 52 international 
projects in 2016 and almost 100 per cent of its expenditure on 
international projects. The same pattern can be detected for 
the average amount spent on international projects, which was 
just ¥15.92m (£1.79m).
The economic capacity of Chinese foundations also scores 
rather low, ranging from 0.14 in 2014 to 0.20 in 2019. Access to 
funding appears to be a major obstacle to the development of 
Chinese NGOs, but this average score hides large differences 
between the foundations. The annual income of different 
foundations differs substantially, with the highest total income 
for the year being around ¥1.57bn (£0.18bn) and the lowest being 
around ¥0.37m (£41,556), and with the average value being only 
¥173.02m (£19.43m). A few large foundations receive government 
subsidy income, such as the China Women’s Development 
Foundation (CWDF), the China Friendship Foundation for Peace 
and Development (CFFPD), the China Development Research 
Foundation (CDRF), CCTF, and so forth, yet most foundations do 
not. In addition, the fixed assets and net assets of foundations are 
not only low but also vary greatly. For example, in 2014, the ZTE 
Foundation (ZTEF) and YPLCF had zero fixed assets, while CYDF 
had fixed assets of ¥141.53m (£15.90m) in the same year.
5.3 A detailed breakdown for the 36 foundations
Table 2 provides an overview of the individual scores for the 
36 foundations in our sample, ranked according to their total 
scores for the CIC index (column 2). One foundation (CFPA) stands 
out with a score of 0.55. Around half of the foundations score 
medium (higher than 0.4 on the CIC index), the other half score 
low (below 0.4).
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Table 2 Average CIC for the 36 foundations over the six years of 2014–19


















CFPA 0.55 1.00 0.38 0.68 0.49 0.18
CDRF 0.51 1.00 0.21 0.33 0.71 0.29
CWDF 0.50 1.00 0.34 0.39 0.61 0.16
GHF 0.50 1.00 0.34 0.38 0.64 0.11
CIMF4 0.49 1.00 0.17 0.17 0.64 0.45
CYDF 0.48 1.00 0.43 0.41 0.49 0.10
CCTF 0.48 1.00 0.28 0.32 0.65 0.14
SZOFCF 0.47 1.00 0.20 0.61 0.34 0.17
AF5 0.46 1.00 0.10 0.46 0.53 0.20
ZUEF6 0.43 1.00 0.44 0.36 0.24 0.11
OCCFC7 0.42 1.00 0.17 0.36 0.51 0.06
CEPF8 0.42 1.00 0.15 0.35 0.53 0.04
CFFPD 0.41 1.00 0.14 0.31 0.43 0.19
YCCSEF9 0.41 1.00 0.14 0.35 0.34 0.21
SHACF10 0.40 1.00 0.16 0.39 0.45 0.01
IMLNF11 0.40 1.00 0.29 0.19 0.30 0.22
CGCF12 0.40 1.00 0.14 0.30 0.45 0.12
CFYEE13 0.40 1.00 0.17 0.36 0.41 0.04
CCF14 0.39 1.00 0.04 0.30 0.53 0.07
CLEF 0.37 1.00 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.29
SOCF15 0.37 1.00 0.13 0.29 0.39 0.06
CSAF16 0.37 1.00 0.17 0.30 0.39 0.01
CFCHC17 0.37 1.00 0.12 0.28 0.46 0.00
CSCF 0.37 1.00 0.15 0.31 0.37 0.02
LSCF18 0.36 1.00 0.14 0.38 0.22 0.06
CTF19 0.35 1.00 0.06 0.29 0.33 0.05
CFCAC20 0.35 1.00 0.13 0.21 0.39 0.02
CFHRD21 0.35 1.00 0.02 0.29 0.36 0.06
CVSF22 0.35 1.00 0.14 0.33 0.24 0.01
ZTEF 0.34 1.00 0.12 0.31 0.27 0.01
CBDIRF 0.34 1.00 0.19 0.28 0.24 0.00
WIFA23 0.34 1.00 0.02 0.11 0.46 0.10
ISEFC 0.33 1.00 0.04 0.32 0.27 0.02
CSDF24 0.33 1.00 0.11 0.08 0.38 0.07
TXZEF25 0.30 1.00 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.07
YPLCF 0.27 1.00 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.03
Source Authors’ own.
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The following observations can be made for sub-dimensions with 
differing scores. For organisational economic capacity, a large 
majority scores very low (25). Only two foundations are medium, 
and seven are low. For human resource capacity, a large majority 
scores low (6) or very low (26), and only two score medium (0.46). 
The situation is more balanced for organisational sustainability, 
with five foundations scoring high; 12 medium; 17 low; and two 
very low. For international cooperation experience, only one 
foundation reached the medium level, five foundations score low 
and the remaining 30 foundations score very low.
The 36 foundations were then clustered according to their scores 
on the various dimensions of the CIC (Table 3). The international 
cooperation experience, the dimension that has the closest 
relationship with the actual performance of the foundations 
within the CIC index, is confronted with the other dimensions, 
which should be seen as ‘foundational’ dimensions.
First, only one single foundation has a high score both for 
international cooperation experience and human resource 
capacity (AF). Three foundations (CLEF, IMLNF, and CIMF) obtain 
a high score for international cooperation experience but a low 
score for human resource capacity. This group should consider 
attracting professionals and expanding the number of volunteers 
to increase their CIC scores. Second, two foundations (CDRF 
and IMLNF) have a high score both for international cooperation 
experience and organisational economic capacity, indicating 
that strong economic power can help foundations to engage in 
international cooperation.
Four foundations (AF, CLEF, YCCSEF, and CIMF) have a high score 
for international cooperation experience but a low score for 
organisational economic capacity. This group has a relatively 
strong experience in international cooperation and could be a 
Table 3 Cluster of the dimensions of the Foundation’s CIC
International cooperation experience
High Low
Human resource capacity High AF SHACF
Low CLEF, IMLNF, CIMF Remaining foundations
Organisational economic 
capacity
High CDRF, IMLNF CBDIRF
Low AF, CLEF, YCCSEF, CIMF Remaining foundations
Organisational sustainability High CIMF, CDRF CFCHC, CEPF
Low CLEF, AF Remaining foundations
Source Authors’ own.
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priority for the Chinese government to provide additional financial 
assistance to support them in scaling up their international 
cooperation activities.
Third, two foundations (CLEF and AF) have a high score for 
international cooperation experience but a low score for 
organisational sustainability. For these foundations, further 
broadening the diversity of their income, and attracting and 
retaining professional talent through remuneration could be 
important breakthroughs to further improve their CIC.
Finally, two foundations (SHACF and CBDIRF) scored low for 
international cooperation experience but high for human resource 
capacity and organisational economic capacity. For these 
foundations, international cooperation is not currently a priority, 
but they have the infrastructure and potential to engage in it.
6 Conclusion
The average organisational CIC of foundations in China from 2014 
to 2019 is still limited and cannot truly meet China’s expectations 
of advocating NGOs to ‘go out’ in the context of the BRI. At the 
same time, our CIC index suggests that many foundations are 
gradually improving their capacity.
Establishing the exact reasons for the lower scores would require 
follow-up research but there are indications that the following 
factors contribute to the current situation: the inadequate legal 
framework to govern the specific activities of NGOs overseas; 
insufficient financial support from the government; insufficient 
number of dedicated staff and volunteers; and insufficient 
experience in international cooperation.
However, China’s foundations are slowly turning their attention to 
low-income countries. All the foundations in our sample comply 
with government regulations in the area of governance and 
some have high scores for organisational sustainability. Relying on 
organisational governance and sustainability, a few foundations 
have accumulated a relative wealth of experience in engaging in 
international cooperation, such as AF, CDRF, IMLNF, and CIMF.
In addition, 10–15 per cent of the foundations have relatively 
large budgets and capacity for their domestic operations, but 
only a few currently mobilise substantial human and financial 
resources for their international activities. For them, international 
cooperation is not currently a priority, but they have the 
infrastructure and potential to engage in it.
In conclusion, we can say that in the context of the BRI, only 
a few Chinese foundations that have large budgets are 
encouraged by the positive policy framework to truly ‘go out’, 
although in a careful and modest way. Foundations that are not 
yet adequately staffed and funded could be a priority for the 
Chinese government to support their engagement in international 
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cooperation voluntarily and proactively. Most foundations that 
lack both experience and enthusiasm to engage in international 
cooperation due to policy risk concerns, lack of funding, and lack 
of talent, are not fully ready for ‘going out’.
There are further policy implications which can be identified. The 
legal framework for the international activities of Chinese NGOs 
still contains gaps, which should be clarified through legislation. 
The Chinese government should consider providing adequate 
financial support to NGOs for international cooperation. NGOs 
should also organise themselves at a collective level to create 
opportunities for the exchange of experience, professional 
development, and expanding fundraising channels. Due to the 
availability of data, there are two main limitations of this study: 
first, social organisations, the category of NGO with the most 
international cooperation activities, are not included in the 
research sample; and second, the study does not include the 
softer dimensions of capacity, such as legitimacy, organisational 
culture, and resilience.
Notes
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